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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Loida Colonna, Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
Marlboro Park Hospital, Employer, and Gallagher 
Bassett Services, Inc., Carrier, Respondents. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2013-001599 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal from Florence County 

Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge  

Opinion No. 27513 

Heard March 17, 2015 – Filed April 8, 2015 

CERTIORARI DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY 

GRANTED 

Stephen Benjamin Samuels, of Samuels Law Firm, LLC, 
of Columbia, for Petitioner.  
Weston Adams, III, of McAngus Goudelock & Courie, 
L.L.C., of Columbia, and Helen Faith Hiser, of McAngus 
Goudelock & Courie, L.L.C., of Mount Pleasant,  both 
for Respondents. 
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PER CURIAM: We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision in 
Colonna v. Marlboro Park Hospital, 404 S.C. 537, 745 S.E.2d 128 (Ct. App. 
2013). After careful consideration of the Appendix and briefs, the writ of certiorari 
is 
DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED. 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., 
concur.
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Kenneth W. Workman, Petitioner, 
v. 

State of South Carolina, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2013-002789 

Lower Court Case No. 2012-CP-23-02386 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Appeal From Greenville County 
The Honorable C. Victor Pyle, Jr., Circuit Court Judge 
The Honorable Edward W. Miller, Post Conviction Judge
Opinion No. 27514 

Submitted March 19, 2015 – Filed April 15, 2015 

REVERSED AND REMANDED  

Susannah Conyers Ross, of Ross & Enderlin, PA, of 
Greenville, for Petitioner. 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior 
Assistant Attorney General Karen Christine Ratigan, both 
of Columbia, for Respondent.
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PER CURIAM: Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari from the dismissal, after a 
hearing, of his application for post-conviction relief (PCR).  We grant the petition 
for a writ of certiorari, dispense with further briefing, and reverse.
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In a joint trial, petitioner and codefendant Oshawn Robinson were convicted of 
assault and battery, conspiracy, possession of a weapon during the commission of a 
violent crime, and armed robbery. After petitioner's direct appeal was dismissed 
pursuant to Anders,1 petitioner filed an application for PCR, alleging trial counsel 
was ineffective in failing to object to a coercive Allen2 charge and in failing to 
challenge the trial judge's ruling barring cross-examination of the State's witness, 
Timothy Wright, regarding the sentencing recommendation Wright received in 
exchange for testifying against petitioner and Robinson. 
The PCR judge denied petitioner's application for PCR, finding (1) petitioner failed 
to meet his burden of proving trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to 
the Allen charge, as the charge was not unduly coercive; and (2) petitioner was not 
prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to challenge the ruling barring cross-
examination regarding Wright's sentence. 
ISSUES 
Was trial counsel ineffective in failing to object to the Allen charge? 
Was trial counsel ineffective in failing to challenge the ruling barring cross-
examination regarding Wright's sentence? 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
In South Carolina state courts, an Allen charge cannot be directed to the minority 
voters on the jury panel.  Green v. State, 351 S.C. 184, 194, 569 S.E.2d 318, 323 
(2002). Instead, an Allen charge should be even-handed, directing both the 
majority and the minority to consider the other's views.  Id. A trial judge has a 
duty to urge, but not coerce, a jury to reach a verdict. Id. Whether an Allen charge 
is unconstitutionally coercive must be judged in its "context and under all the 
1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
2 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
13
 
  
circumstances."  Tucker v. Catoe, 346 S.C. 483, 490-91, 552 S.E.2d 712, 716 
(2001). The four factors adopted by this Court in Tucker to determine whether an 
Allen charge is unconstitutionally coercive are: 
(1) Does the charge speak specifically to the minority 
juror(s)? 
(2) Does the charge include any language such as "You 
have got to reach a decision in this case"? 
(3) Is there an inquiry into the jury's numerical division, 
which is generally coercive? 
(4) 	 Does the time between when the charge was given, 
and when the jury returned a verdict, demonstrate 
coercion? 
At trial, victim testified two men robbed him at gunpoint.  Victim identified 
petitioner and Robinson as his assailants after seeing their pictures on the evening 
news. However, a third person, Timothy Wright, pled guilty to robbing victim.  
Wright testified he conspired with petitioner and Robinson to rob victim and all 
three men robbed victim together.   
The defense called an expert witness to testify regarding false identification.  The 
expert testified to the hazards of cross-racial identification, memory development 
during short and traumatic events, and how memories can be influenced when 
there is a suggestive succeeding event, such as a news broadcast featuring pictures 
of the defendants. 
Neither petitioner nor Robinson testified, and the jury began deliberations at 10:33 
a.m. From 10:56 a.m. to 11:26 a.m., the jury re-listened to Wright's testimony.  At 
1:15 p.m., the jury asked the trial judge if there were three photographs displayed 
on the news broadcast wherein victim identified petitioner and Robinson as his 
assailants, or if there were photographs of only two people.  The trial judge 
informed the jury he could not answer this question, as it pertained to the facts of 
the case.  At 2:50 p.m., the jurors indicated they could not reach a unanimous 
decision. The trial judge gave an Allen charge, which stated in relevant part: 
Now it's been said that jury service is perhaps the highest 
service that a citizen can perform for his or her country 
14
 
  
 
 
 
during peace-time.  And I certainly agree with that.  
However, I tell you that a juror does not render good 
jury service who arbitrarily says, I know what I want to 
do in this case, and if and when everybody agrees with 
me, then we'll write a verdict.  And we will not write a 
verdict until that time.
. . . . 
I tell you that it is the duty of each of you to tell the 
others how you feel and why you feel that way. 
However, I also tell you that if much the larger number
of your panel are in favor of one particular verdict, then 
a dissenting [sic] juror or jurors should consider 
whether or not his or her or their positions is a 
reasonable one which makes no impression upon the 
minds of the majority. 
In other words, if a majority of you are for one particular 
form of a verdict, the minority ought to seriously ask 
themselves whether they can reasonably doubt the 
correctness of the judgment of the majority. 
(Emphasis added).  The trial judge did not charge the majority jurors to consider 
the positions of the minority jurors.  The trial judge concluded the Allen charge by 
stating:
Therefore, ladies and gentlemen, I cannot accept any 
report at this time that you cannot agree on a unanimous 
verdict in this case. I am of the opinion that you have not 
deliberated sufficiently long that I could in good 
conscience accept that report.  And I tell you frankly it 
will take considerably more time before I am convinced 
that you cannot reach a verdict. 
I therefore, humbly beseech you to return to your jury 
room, continue your deliberations with the hope that you 
can arrive at a unanimous verdict within a reasonable 
time. 
15
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
(Emphasis added).  Trial counsel made no objection to the charge, and the jury 
returned a guilty verdict at 4:47 p.m., two hours after receiving the Allen charge. 
In light of the four factors delineated in Tucker, we find the Allen charge given at 
petitioner's trial was unconstitutionally coercive.  See Tucker, supra (finding an 
Allen charge violated the defendant's due process rights when the charge, viewed 
as a whole, was impermissibly directed at minority jurors and when the jurors 
returned a guilty verdict an hour and a half after receiving the charge); State v. 
Williams, 386 S.C. 503, 690 S.E.2d 62 (2010) at note 7 (cautioning trial judges 
against using the language "with the hope that you can arrive at a verdict" because 
the language could potentially be construed as coercive, as jurors are not required 
to reach a verdict after expressing they are deadlocked). Accordingly, we find trial 
counsel was deficient in failing to object to the charge.   
Further, we find petitioner was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance 
in failing to object to the unconstitutionally coercive Allen charge.  See Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) (stating prejudice is defined as a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different). 
CONCLUSION 
We find petitioner was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance in 
failing to object to an unconstitutionally coercive Allen charge; accordingly, we 
grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, dispense with further briefing, reverse the 
PCR judge's denial of relief, and remand for a new trial in the criminal case. 
Because we grant petitioner relief on the first issue presented, we need not address 
petitioner's remaining issue.  See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 
335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (appellate court need not address 
remaining issues when disposition of prior issue is dispositive). 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., 
concur.
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
In the Matter of Joel F. Geer, Respondent 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000734 

Appellate Case No. 2015-000735 

ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel petitions this Court to place respondent on 
interim suspension pursuant to Rule 17 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). The petition also seeks appointment of the Receiver, Peyre T. 
Lumpkin, pursuant to Rule 31, RLDE.   
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
until further order of this Court. 
Respondent is hereby enjoined from taking any action regarding any trust, escrow, 
operating, and any other law office account(s) respondent may maintain at any 
bank or other financial institution, including, but not limited to, making any 
withdrawal or transfer, or writing any check or other instrument on the account(s).   
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Lumpkin is hereby appointed to assume
responsibility for respondent's client files, trust account(s), escrow account(s), 
operating account(s), and any other law office account(s) respondent may 
maintain. Mr. Lumpkin shall take action as required by Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, 
SCACR, to protect the interests of respondent's clients.  Mr. Lumpkin may make 
disbursements from respondent's trust account(s), escrow account(s), operating 
account(s), and any other law office account(s) respondent may maintain that are 
necessary to effectuate this appointment.  Respondent shall promptly respond to 
Mr. Lumpkin's requests for information and/or documentation and shall fully 
cooperate with Mr. Lumpkin in all other respects.     
17 

  
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
  
Further, this Order, when served on any bank or other financial institution 
maintaining trust, escrow, operating, and/or any other law account(s) of 
respondent, shall serve as notice to the bank or other financial institution that Peyre 
T. Lumpkin has been duly appointed by this Court and that respondent is enjoined 
from making withdrawals or transfers from or writing any check or other 
instrument on any of the account(s).
Finally, this Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, 
shall serve as notice that the Receiver, Peyre T. Lumpkin, Esquire, has been duly 
appointed by this Court and has the authority to receive respondent's mail and the 
authority to direct that respondent's mail be delivered to Mr. Lumpkin's office. 
Mr. Lumpkin's appointment shall be for a period of no longer than nine months 
unless an extension of the period of appointment is requested. 
s/ Jean H. Toal C.J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
April 10, 2015 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
 
 
The State, Respondent, 
 
v. 

 
Dwayne Eddie Starks, Petitioner. 

 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000013 

Lower Court Case No. 2012-GS-01-00392 

ORDER 
Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals 
in State v. Starks, 410 S.C. 580, 765 S.E.2d 148 (Ct. App. 2014). The petition is 
denied. However, we hereby direct the Court of Appeals to depublish the opinion 
in this case (Op. No. 5276). 
s/ Jean H. Toal  C.J. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
April 9, 2015 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 

 
 
 
Duke Energy Carolinas, L.L.C., Petitioner,  
 
v. 
 
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental 
Control, South Carolina Attorney General, American 
Rivers, and The South Carolina Coastal Conservation 
League, Defendants, 
 
Of Whom South Carolina Department of Health and 
Environmental Control, American Rivers, and The South 
Carolina Coastal Conservation League are the 
Respondents. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2013-001118 
Lower Court Case No. 2009-ALC-07-0377-CC 
ORDER 
The parties submitted a consent motion to dismiss this matter in which petitioner 
sought review of the Court of Appeals' opinion in Duke Energy Carolinas, L.L.C. 
v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Env't Control, 404 S.C. 119, 744 S.E.2d 194 (Ct. App. 
2012). We grant the consent motion to dismiss this matter.  We hereby direct the 
Court of Appeals to depublish its opinion and assign the matter an unpublished 
opinion number.  The above opinion shall no longer have any precedential effect.   
20 

  
 
s/ Jean H. Toal  C.J. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
April 10, 2015 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
RE: Proposed Amendments the South Carolina Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 407 of the South Carolina 
Appellate Court Rules 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000495 
ORDER 
The South Carolina Bar has proposed amending Rule 1.0, containing terminology, 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct to include the following definition of 
"person": "Person" includes an individual, corporation, company, limited liability 
company, association, trust, partnership and any other organization or entity.
Pursuant to Article V, § 4, of the South Carolina Constitution, we hereby amend 
Rule 1.0 of Rule 4.7, SCACR, as requested by the Bar.  The definition will appear 
as Rule 1.0(j). We also amend references to Rule 1.0 in several comments to the 
Rules of Professional Conduct to reflect the re-lettering of the definitions in Rule 
1.0 and to reflect past changes in lettering. 
These amendments shall become effective immediately.  A copy of the amended 
rules is attached. 
s/ Jean H. Toal C.J. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
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Columbia, South Carolina 
April 15, 2015 
RULE 1.0: TERMINOLOGY 
(a) "Belief" or "believes" denotes that the person involved actually supposed the fact in question 
to be true. A person's belief may be inferred from circumstances. 
(b) "Confirmed in writing," when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes 
informed consent that is given in writing by the person or a writing that a lawyer promptly 
transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (g) for the definition 
of "informed consent." If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person 
gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time 
thereafter. 
(c) "Consult" or "consultation" denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to 
permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question. 
(d) "Depository institution" means any bank, credit union or savings and loan association 
authorized by federal or state laws to do business in South Carolina and insured by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund, or any 
successor insurance corporation(s) established by federal or state law. 
(e) "Firm" or "law firm" denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, professional 
corporation, sole proprietorship or other association, or in a legal services organization; lawyers 
employed in the legal department of a corporation, government, or other organization; and 
lawyers associated with an enterprise who represent clients within the scope of that association. 
(f) "Fraud" or "fraudulent" denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural 
law of the applicable jurisdiction or which has a purpose to deceive.  
(g) "Informed consent" denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after 
the lawyer has communicated reasonably adequate information and explanation about the 
material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct. 
(h) "Knowingly," "known," or "knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A 
person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances. 
(i) "Partner" denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized as a 
professional corporation, or a member of an association authorized to practice law. 
(j) "Person" includes an individual, corporation, company, limited liability company, association, 
trust, partnership and any other organization or entity.  
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 (k) "Reasonable" or "reasonably" when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the 
conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer. 
(l) "Reasonable belief" or "reasonably believes" when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that 
the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is 
reasonable. 
(m) "Reasonably should know" when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of 
reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question. 
(n) "Screened" denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the 
timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the 
circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these 
Rules or other law. 
(o) "Serious crime" denotes any felony; any lesser crime that reflects adversely on the lawyer's 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; or, any crime a necessary 
element of which, as determined by the statutory or common law definition of the crime, 
involves interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, 
deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation, theft, willful failure to file income tax returns, or an 
attempt, conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit a serious crime. 
(p) "Substantial" when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear 
and weighty importance. 
(q) "Tribunal" denotes a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration proceeding, or a legislative 
body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, 
administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after 
the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a binding legal 
judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter. 
(r) "Writing" or "written" denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or 
representation, including handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or 
videorecording and e-mail. A "signed" writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process 
attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the 
intent to sign the writing. 
Comment 
Confirmed in Writing 
[1] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives 
informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. 
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If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that 
consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter.
Firm
[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (d) can depend on the 
specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or
assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they 
present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves 
as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal 
agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is 
the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. 
Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the Rule that is 
involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rule that the same
lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for 
purposes of the Rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. 
[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is 
ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the 
client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a 
subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the 
department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated 
association and its local affiliates.
[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services 
organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or 
different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these Rules.
Fraud
[5] When used in these Rules, the terms "fraud" or "fraudulent" refer to conduct that is 
characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction or 
conduct which has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent 
misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of 
these Rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the 
misrepresentation or failure to inform. 
Informed Consent
[6] Many of the Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent 
of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective 
client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., 
Rules 1.2(c), 1.6(a), 1.7(b), and 1.18(d). The communication necessary to obtain such consent 
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will vary according to the Rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain 
informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other 
person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this 
will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise 
to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the 
material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the 
client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate 
for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need 
not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other 
person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes 
the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In 
determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant 
factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in 
making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently 
represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information 
and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently 
represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed 
consent. 
[7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other 
person. I n general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. 
Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has 
reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's 
consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7(b), 1.9(a), and 1.18(d). For a definition of 
"writing" and "confirmed in writing," see paragraphs (o) and (b). Other Rules require that a 
client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8(a) and (g). For a 
definition of "signed," see paragraph (o). 
Screened
[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is 
permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.8(l), 1.10(e), 1.11, 1.12 or 
1.18. 
[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known 
by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer 
should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm
with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter 
should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the 
personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are 
appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce 
and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the 
firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any 
communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials 
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 relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any 
communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened 
lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen 
to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. 
[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after 
a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. 
Rule 1.6, Comment [8]: 
[8] Paragraph (b)(3) does not limit the breadth of Paragraph (b)(1), but describes one specific 
example of a situation in which disclosure is permitted to prevent a criminal act by the client. 
Paragraph (b)(3) is a limited exception to the rule of confidentiality that permits the lawyer to 
reveal information to the extent necessary to enable affected persons or appropriate authorities to 
prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud, as defined in Rule 1.0(f), that is reasonably 
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial or property interests of another and in 
furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services. Such a serious abuse of 
the client-lawyer relationship by the client forfeits the protection of this Rule. The client can, of 
course, prevent such disclosure by refraining from the wrongful conduct. Although paragraph 
(b)(3) does not require the lawyer to reveal the client's misconduct, the lawyer may not counsel 
or assist the client in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2(d). See 
also Rule 1.16 with respect to the lawyer's obligation or right to withdraw from the 
representation of the client in such circumstances, and Rule 1.13(c), which permits the lawyer, 
where the client is an organization, to reveal information relating to the representation in limited 
circumstances. 
Rule 1.7, Comment [15]: 
[15] Paragraph (b)(3) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because of the institutional 
interest in vigorous development of each client's position when the clients are aligned directly 
against each other in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal. Whether clients 
are aligned directly against each other within the meaning of this paragraph requires examination 
of the context of the proceeding. Although this paragraph does not preclude a lawyer's multiple 
representation of adverse parties to a mediation (because mediation is not a proceeding before a 
"tribunal" under Rule 1.0(q)), such representation may be precluded by paragraph (b)(1). 
Rule 1.7, Comment [18]: 
[18] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in 
writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer 
promptly records and transmits to the client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0(b). See also 
Rule 1.0(r) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the 
writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it 
within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(b). The requirement of a writing does not 
supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and 
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advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably 
available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and 
alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. The better practice is to include within any 
writing the risks, advantages and alternatives discussed as a matter of full disclosure. Rather, the 
writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is 
being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of 
a writing. 
Rule 1.10, Comment [1]: 
[1] For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the term "firm" denotes lawyers in a law 
partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to 
practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a 
corporation or other organization. See Rule 1.0(e). Whether two or more lawyers constitute a 
firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. See Rule 1.0, Comments [2] - [4]. 
For purposes of imputing disqualification under this Rule, however, paragraph (e) treats legal 
services organizations differently from other law firms by permitting screening.
Rule 1.10, Comment [9]: 
[9] Rule 1.10(e) allows programs providing legal services to indigents to avoid imputed 
disqualification by screening lawyers from conflicting matters within the office. See Rule 1.0(n) 
for screening procedures. The authorization of screening is intended to increase the number of 
persons to whom each program can provide legal services, while at the same time protecting the 
clients from prejudice. Paragraph (e) applies only to programs of the type delineated and does 
not authorize screening by private law firms to avoid imputed disqualification. 
Rule 1.11, Comment [6]: 
[6] Paragraphs (b) and (c) contemplate a screening arrangement. See Rule 1.0(n) (requirements 
for screening procedures). These paragraphs do not prohibit a lawyer from receiving a salary or 
partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive 
compensation directly relating the lawyer's compensation to the fee in the matter in which the 
lawyer is disqualified.
Rule 1.12, Comment [4]: 
[4] Requirements for screening procedures are stated in Rule 1.0(n). Paragraph (c)(1) does not 
prohibit the screened lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior 
independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly related to the 
matter in which the lawyer is disqualified. 
Rule 1.13, Comment [3]: 
[3] When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be 
accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy 
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and operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province. 
Paragraph (b) makes clear, however, that when the lawyer knows that the organization is likely 
to be substantially injured by action of an officer or other constituent that violates a legal 
obligation to the organization or is in violation of law that might be imputed to the organization, 
the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. As 
defined in Rule 1.0(h), knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot 
ignore the obvious. 
Rule 1.18, Comment [7]: 
[7] Under paragraph (c), the prohibition in this Rule is imputed to other lawyers as provided in 
Rule 1.10, but, under paragraph (d)(1), imputation may be avoided if the lawyer obtains the 
informed consent, confirmed in writing, of both the prospective and affected clients. In the 
alternative, imputation may be avoided if the conditions of paragraph (d)(2) are met and all 
disqualified lawyers are timely screened and written notice is promptly given to the prospective 
client. See Rule 1.0(n) (requirements for screening procedures). Paragraph (d)(2)(i) does not 
prohibit the screened lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior 
independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly related to the 
matter in which the lawyer is disqualified. 
Rule 2.4, Comment [5]: 
[5] Lawyers who represent clients in alternative dispute resolution processes are governed by the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. When the dispute resolution process takes place before a tribunal, 
as in binding arbitration (see Rule 1.0(q)), the lawyer's duty of candor is governed by Rule 3.3. 
Otherwise, the lawyer's duty of candor toward both the third party neutral and other parties is 
governed by Rule 4.1. 
Rule 3.3, Comment [1]: 
[1] This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the proceedings of a 
tribunal. See Rule 1.0(q) for the definition of "tribunal." It also applies when the lawyer is 
representing a client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal's adjudicative 
authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for example, paragraph (a)(3) requires a lawyer to take 
reasonable remedial measures if the lawyer comes to know that a client who is testifying in a 
deposition has offered evidence that is false. 
Rule 3.3, Comment [8]: 
[8] The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the 
evidence is false. A lawyer's reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its 
presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer's knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be 
inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0(h). Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts 
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about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore 
an obvious falsehood. 
Rule 3.5, Comment [5]: 
[5] The duty to refrain from disruptive conduct applies to any proceeding of a tribunal, including 
a deposition. See Rule 1.0(q) and Rule 3.3, Comment [1]. 
Rule 4.2, Comment [8]: 
[8] The prohibition on communications with a represented person only applies in circumstances 
where the lawyer knows that the person is in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This 
means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such actual 
knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0(h). Thus, the lawyer cannot 
evade the requirement of obtaining the consent of counsel by closing eyes to the obvious. 
Rule 5.1, Comment [1]: 
[1] Paragraph (a) applies to lawyers who have managerial authority over the professional work of 
a firm. See Rule 1.0(e). This includes members of a partnership, the shareholders in a law firm
organized as a professional corporation, and members of other associations authorized to practice 
law; lawyers having comparable managerial authority in a legal services organization or a law 
department of an enterprise or government agency; and lawyers who have intermediate 
managerial responsibilities in a firm. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory 
authority over the work of other lawyers in a firm. 
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R.C. Frederick Hanold, III and Rose F. Hanold, and 
Carol R. Mitchell and George P. Mitchell, Jr., 
Respondents, 
 
v. 
 
Watson's Orchard Property Owners Association, Inc., a 
South Carolina Corporation, Pelham Farm, LLC, a South 
Carolina Corporation, Legacy One, LLC, a South 
Carolina Corporation, SESP, LLC, a South Carolina 
Corporation, an unknown Trustee of the Revocable Trust 
Agreement Dated March 19, 1996, established by James 
B. Stephens as amended, and unknown Jay Stephens and 
Mike Stephens as Co-Personal Representative of the 
Estate of James B. Stephens, Defendants, 
 
Of whom Pelham Farm, LLC, a South Carolina 
Corporation, Legacy One, LLC, a South Carolina 
Corporation, an unknown Trustee of the Revocable Trust 
Agreement Dated March 19, 1996, established by James 
B. Stephens as amended, and unknown Jay Stephens and 
Mike Stephens as Co-Personal Representative of the 
Estate of James B. Stephens, are the Appellants. 
 
v. 
 
Property Owners in Watson's Orchard Subdivision:  N. 
Carter Poe, III; McNally Reeves, as Trustee of the 
Residual Trust under Item Five of the Last 
Will and Testament of Hattie L. Reeves dated February 
9, 1998; Janet B. Yusi; Lucy S. Tiller; James G. 
Stephens; Rachel P. McKaughan; Ramon J. Ashy and 
Jana Ashy; Christopher D. Scalzo and Heather V. Scalzo; 
Erma R. Rash, as Trustee of the Erma R. Rash Revocable 
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Trust dated February 12, 2010; James Edwin Conrad, as 
Trustee of the James Edwin Conrad Living Trust dated 
September 7, 2010; Sue Lane Conrad; Horst H. H. 
Eschenberg and Floride C. Eschenberg; Caryl L. Clover, 
as Trustee of the Caryl L. Clover Revocable Living Trust 
Agreement dated May 12, 1999; Mary F. Newell; 
Timothy M. Conroy and Elizabeth W. Conroy; Nathan 
Scolari; Joel Wells Norwood and Lynn Norwood; J. 
Lynn Shook; Juan Hernandez and Janice M. Pelletier; 
Scott P. Payne and Kathleen H. Payne; Joe G. Thomason 
and Dana L. Henry Thomason; Traci Segura; Cameron E. 
Smith and Joan B. Smith; Charles E. Howard and Sharon 
F. Howard; Penelope J. Galbraith; Meredith C. Vry; 
Delores B. Mitchell; Lisette M. Silva and Mary F. 
Colley; Ilona K. Alford and William G. Alford; George 
T. McLeod and Martha T. McLeod; Ronald S. Wilson 
and Robin E. Wilson; The Merrill J. Gildersleeve and 
Anore L. Novak Revocable Living Trust dated 
November 1, 1996; Anna Marie T. Azores and Kim O. 
Gococo; Ashley Westrope as Trustee of Martha 
Randolph Westrop Trust dated June 6, 1988; Cliff C. 
Jollie and Martha W. Jollie; David A. Saliny and Xiaoli 
Saliny; Lecia S. Franklin; Dean D. Varner and Deborah 
P. Varner; W. Frank Durham, Jr.; Christine M. Howard; 
Samuel P. Howard, Jr. and Jane H. Howard; Manfred E. 
Kramer and Jane J. Kramer; Mary J. Steele; James J. 
Barrett, III and Kimberly A. Barrett; Richard A. Herman 
and Patricia L. Herrman, Third-Party Defendants. 
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Opinion No. 5312 

Heard November 4, 2014 – Filed April 15, 2015 

AFFIRMED 
William D. Herlong, of The Herlong Law Firm, LLC, of 
Greenville, for Appellants. 
Randall Scott Hiller, of Greenville, for Respondents.  
WILLIAMS, J.: Pelham Farm, LLC; Legacy One, LLC; an unknown trustee of 
the revocable trust agreement established by James B. Stephens; and Jay Stephens 
and Mike Stephens, as co-personal representatives of the estate of James B. 
Stephens (collectively Appellants1) contend the circuit court erred in finding their 
amendment to a restrictive covenant that governed the development of property in 
Greenville County, South Carolina, was invalid for lack of a majority vote.  We 
affirm.   
FACTS
In the 1960s, Richard Watson and his wife began developing their substantial 
landholdings that stretched from present-day I-385 up to and across the north and 
south side of Pelham Road in Greenville, South Carolina.  Prior to this time, 
Watson's land was used as an orchard. Once development began, restrictions were 
placed on the entire property2 to limit its development to single family residential 
use. Subsequently, a subdivision plat was recorded that created forty-seven lots in 
1 Watson's Orchard Property Owners Association, Inc. (WOPOA) was a defendant 
in the declaratory judgment action but did not appeal the underlying decision.   
2 In January 1962, the Watsons recorded a preliminary protective covenant that 
applied to the property on both the north and south side of Pelham Road.    
33 

                                         
 
 
 
what is currently known as Watson's Orchard Subdivision.3  Thereafter, these lots 
were developed into upscale homes.  
 
In 1979, Watson recognized that his property south of Pelham Road could realize a 
greater value if developed commercially.  As a result, he sold the vast majority of 
his property on the south side of Pelham Road to Lincoln of South Carolina, Inc. 
(Lincoln).  Lincoln then entered into negotiations with the owners of the lots in 
Watson's Orchard Subdivision to obtain a release of the residential use restrictions 
for Watson's property south of Pelham Road.  These negotiations resulted in the 
property owners, with the exception of J.B. Stephens, agreeing to release the 
restrictions in exchange for the transfer of a twenty-two acre buffer zone on the 
south side of Pelham Road, that was to be sold and developed as single family 
residential lots.  
As part of the agreement, the property in the buffer zone was to be owned by 
Watson's Orchard Property Owners Association, Inc. (WOPOA), a for profit 
corporation tasked with the responsibility of developing and selling the lots within 
the buffer zone. The stock in WOPOA was granted to the owners of Watson's 
Orchard Subdivision who would ultimately benefit financially from the sale of the 
lots within the twenty-two acres.   
In 1981, Lincoln, as the declarant, imposed the Restrictions and Covenants (1981 
R&Cs), which are the subject of this action, upon the twenty-two acre buffer zone.  
Thereafter, Lincoln conveyed the twenty-two acre tract of land to WOPOA.  
Although J.B. Stephens did not have any stock in WOPOA, in exchange for his 
cooperation to release the residential use restrictions, Stephens purchased six acres 
on the south side of Pelham Road (the Property) directly across from Watson's 
Orchard Subdivision from WOPOA.  This six-acre tract contained sufficient 
property to allow it to be developed into five residential lots.  The successors to 
J.B. Stephens are the appellants in this action.    
3 In September 1964, after the forty-seven lots were platted and approved, 
additional restrictions and protective covenants were recorded specifically for 
Watson's Orchard Subdivision, all of which are still in effect today.  
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The 1981 R&Cs included a provision requiring a majority vote of the current 
property owners of Watson's Orchard Subdivision, as well as the owners of the lots 
in the buffer zone, to change or amend the 1981 R&Cs.  The pertinent provision 
states the following: 
[T]he covenants, conditions[,] and restrictions hereinafter 
set forth shall run with the property . . . and be binding 
upon all parties having any right, title or interest in the 
said described properties . . . until January 1, 2010[,] at 
which time said covenants, conditions, and restrictions 
shall be automatically extended for successive periods of 
ten (10) years each unless, by vote of a majority of the 
then owners of the lots into which the property described 
above shall have been developed and in Watson's 
Orchard Subdivision, the within covenants, conditions[,] 
and restrictions are changed or amended, in whole or in 
part. 
(emphasis added).  In 2005, J.B. Stephens attempted to purchase the remainder of 
the property in the buffer zone owned by WOPOA for over two million dollars.  
The transaction was never consummated, but Respondents contend it spurred 
Appellants' efforts to amend the 1981 R&Cs, which prompted the present 
litigation. 
Several months prior to the January 1, 2010 date listed in the 1981 R&Cs, 
Appellants attempted to amend the 1981 R&Cs to remove the residential 
development requirement for the property that abuts J.B. Stephens' acreage south 
of Pelham Road.  Appellants obtained twenty-nine of fifty-four possible votes4 in 
favor of amending the 1981 R&Cs, and then filed the amended Restrictions and 
Covenants (2009 R&Cs) in the Greenville County Register of Deeds Office on 
November 9, 2009.  Of the necessary twenty-nine votes, Appellants asserted they 
possessed five votes based on the five "lots" within the six acres purchased by J.B. 
Stephens in 1981.  
4 Respondents contend the number of votes allotted to J.B. Stephens was directly 
correlated to how many favorable votes the board of WOPOA needed to remove 
the restrictions, citing to a document in which the board postulated different ways 
to count J.B. Stephens' votes to obtain a majority vote.  
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Homeowners R.C. Frederick Hanold III, Rose Hanold, Carol Mitchell, and George 
Mitchell Jr., (Respondents) filed suit on September 8, 2009, seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the 2009 R&Cs were not validly adopted.  WOPOA and Appellants 
answered and counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the 2009 R&Cs were 
valid. WOPOA and Appellants filed an amended answer, adding the property 
owners in WOPOA as third-party defendants.  The property owners did not 
respond and default judgment was entered against them. WOPOA, Appellants, 
and Respondents then filed cross motions for summary judgment on April 27, 
2012, and the circuit court denied both motions, finding genuine issues of material 
fact existed and, thus, summary judgment was inappropriate.  
The circuit court received testimony and evidence from both parties on September 
4 and 5, 2012, in the declaratory judgment action.  In its order finding for 
Respondents, the circuit court concluded the Property had "not been developed into 
lots for the purpose of being entitled to vote to amend or modify the restrictive 
covenants." The circuit court concluded the plain and unambiguous language of 
the 1981 R&Cs required the lots be developed prior to being eligible to vote.  The 
court cited the following in support of its conclusion: (1) Appellants failed to 
demonstrate a plat was ever prepared or recorded as required by Greenville County 
ordinance, which was a prerequisite to subdividing or offering a lot for sale; (2) the 
Property possessed a single tax map number, preventing it from being legally sold 
as five individual lots on the date of the purported amendment; and (3) the 1981 
deed of sale and other supporting documents offered to demonstrate the six-acre 
tract was comprised of five separate lots only showed the intent of the parties to the 
conveyance, not the intent of Lincoln, which is paramount in interpreting a 
restrictive covenant. The court then ruled the amendment to the 1981 R&Cs and 
subsequent recording of the 2009 R&Cs were both void and of no force and effect.  
This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Declaratory judgments in and of themselves are neither legal nor equitable."  
Campbell v. Marion Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 354 S.C. 274, 279, 580 S.E.2d 163, 165 (Ct. 
App. 2003). "The standard of review for a declaratory judgment action is therefore 
determined by the nature of the underlying issue."  Id.
"Restrictive covenants are contractual in nature."  Hardy v. Aiken, 369 S.C. 160, 
166, 631 S.E.2d 539, 542 (2006).  An action to enforce restrictive covenants by 
means of injunctive relief, however, is an action in equity.  Cedar Cove 
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Homeowners Ass'n v. DiPietro, 368 S.C. 254, 258, 628 S.E.2d 284, 286 (Ct. App. 
2006). In an equitable action, we may find the facts in accordance with our own 
view of the evidence. Id.  "While this standard permits a broad scope of review, an 
appellate court will not disregard the findings of the [circuit] court, which saw and 
heard the witnesses and was in a better position to evaluate their credibility."  
Buffington v. T.O.E. Enters., 383 S.C. 388, 391, 680 S.E.2d 289, 290 (2009).
In this case, Respondents requested the circuit court enjoin and restrain Appellants 
from using the property in any manner inconsistent with the 1981 R&Cs.  The 
circuit court, in declaring the amendment to the 2009 R&Cs invalid, effectively 
enjoined Respondents from developing the property in any manner inconsistent 
with the 1981 R&Cs. Accordingly, this action sounds in equity, and we may 
review the circuit court's factual findings in accordance with our own view of the 
preponderance of the evidence. See Cullen v. McNeal, 390 S.C. 470, 481, 702 
S.E.2d 378, 384 (Ct. App. 2010). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
Appellants claim the circuit court failed to consider overwhelming evidence in 
their favor when it declared the 1981 R&Cs were improperly amended.  
Specifically, Appellants contend the circuit court erred in (1) ignoring 
documentary evidence, lay witness testimony, and expert testimony that 
overwhelmingly established the Property was comprised of five lots; (2) 
improperly relying on state and local law when it concluded Appellants were 
required to record the plat of the Property as a prerequisite to subdividing the 
Property into lots; and (3) failing to consider the text of the 1981 R&Cs as well as 
the drafter's intentions when it concluded the Property was not developed into lots.  
We address each argument in turn.   
I. Documentary Evidence & Lay and Expert Testimony 
Appellants first contend the overwhelming evidence demonstrated the Property 
was comprised of five developed lots, thus entitling Appellants to five votes 
pursuant to the 1981 R&Cs. Because we hold the Property does not satisfy the 
plain and ordinary meaning of "lots which shall have been developed," we affirm 
the circuit court and find it properly declined to consider this evidence.   
"[A] restriction on the use of the property must be created in express terms or by 
plain and unmistakable implication, and all such restrictions are to be strictly 
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construed, with all doubts resolved in favor of the free use of property."  Hardy, 
369 S.C. at 166, 631 S.E.2d at 542 (alteration in original).  "The language of a 
restrictive covenant is to be construed according to the plain and ordinary meaning 
attributed to it at the time of execution."  Id.  "[T]he paramount rule of construction 
is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties as determined from the 
whole document." Taylor v. Lindsey, 332 S.C. 1, 4, 498 S.E.2d 862, 863–64 
(1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "When the language of a 
contract is clear, explicit, and unambiguous, the language of the contract alone 
determines the contract's force and effect . . . ."  Moser v. Gosnell, 334 S.C. 425, 
430, 513 S.E.2d 123, 125 (Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted). To that end, when the 
language creating restrictions on the use of property is unambiguous, the 
restrictions will be enforced according to their plain and obvious meaning.
Shipyard Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Mangiaracina, 307 S.C. 299, 308, 414 S.E.2d 
795, 801 (Ct. App. 1992). 
We find the plain language of the 1981 R&Cs only afforded a property owner 
voting rights for developed lots. The term "developed" is not defined in the 1981 
R&Cs. However, resort to its usual and customary definition leads us to the 
conclusion that the Property was not developed into lots as required by the 1981 
R&Cs.  See Anderson v. Buonforte, 365 S.C. 482, 490, 617 S.E.2d 750, 754 (Ct. 
App. 2005) ("When a term is not defined within a contract, evidence of its usual 
and customary meaning is competent to aid in determining its meaning."); Strother 
v. Lexington Cnty. Recreation Comm'n, 332 S.C. 54, 62, 504 S.E.2d 117, 122 
(1998) (holding when faced with an undefined term, the court must interpret the 
term in accord with its usual and customary meaning). 
South Carolina courts have not expressly defined the term "developed" in the 
context of restrictive covenants pertaining to landholdings.  However, cases from 
other jurisdictions dealing with the term "developed" in the context of land confirm 
that "develop" connotes conversion into an area suitable for use or sale.5 See 
5 Respondents cite to a Greenville County ordinance as further proof that for a 
parcel of land to be subdivided into lots for purposes of development, there must 
be an intent to sell, lease, or build on the property.  See Greenville County, S.C., 
Ordinance 4225 (Sept. 16, 2008) ("Subdivision means all divisions of a tract or 
parcel of land into two or more lots, building sites, or other divisions for the 
purpose, whether immediate or future, of sale, lease, or building development[. . . 
.]"). 
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Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc., 807 P.2d 487, 496 (Alaska 
1991) ("In the context of raw land, the common meaning of 'developed' includes 
subdivided property which is ready for sale." (footnote omitted)); Winkelman v. 
City of Tiburon, 32 Cal. App. 3d 834, 843 (Ct. App. 1973) ("The term 'develop'
connotes the act of converting a tract of land into an area suitable for residential or 
business uses."); Prince George's Cnty. v. Equitable Trust Co., 408 A.2d 737, 742 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (defining the term "develop" as "the act of converting a 
tract of land into an area suitable for residential or business uses" (citing Webster's 
New Int'l Dictionary (2d ed.1959)); Muirhead v. Pilot Props., Inc., 258 So. 2d 232, 
233 (Miss. 1972) (stating "[t]he term 'develop' has generally been interpreted when 
used in connection with real estate to mean the converting of a tract of land into an 
area suitable for residential or business uses"); Sleasman v. City of Lacey, 151 P.3d 
990, 991 (Wash. 2007) (finding an ordinance requiring a permit for tree removal 
on "undeveloped" or "partially developed" property did not apply to the 
homeowners' property because under the plain meaning of the ordinance, the 
property was "developed" as it was a lawful building site ready for sale or use); B 
& W Constr., Inc. v. City of Lacey, 577 P.2d 583, 586 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) 
(finding the platting of property on paper without further steps to develop it, such 
as adding sewers, streets, and utilities, was insufficient to show a lot was 
developed for purposes of establishing comparable value of property in an inverse 
condemnation case); cf. Best Bldg. Co. v. Sikes, 394 S.W.2d 57, 63 (Tex. App. 
1965) (approving the trial court's finding in a breach of contract action based in 
part on extrinsic evidence that the term "develop" would include the acts of 
subdividing a tract of land into lots, adding streets, and installing utilities). 
Merriam-Webster's Dictionary defines "develop" in a land context as follows: "to 
convert (as raw land) into an area suitable for residential or business purposes 
<they [develop]ed several large tracts on the edge of town>; also: to alter raw land 
into (an area suitable for building) <the subdivisions that they [develop]ed were 
soon built up>." See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 618 (3d ed. 1986).  
Although the most recent edition of Black's Law Dictionary does not define the 
term "develop" or "developed," it states "improved land"6 is "[l]and that has been 
6 We are, however, aware that "developed" land is not always tantamount to 
"improved" land.  See Sleasman, 151 P.3d at 993 (finding that after land is 
developed, it may then be improved by adding a structure to the land, and 
clarifying that "one cannot build or improve upon a lot unless it is developed"). 
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developed; esp., land occupied by buildings and structures," whereas "unimproved 
land" is "[r]aw land that has never been developed, and usu[ally] that lacks 
utilities." Black's Law Dictionary 1008–09 (10th ed. 2014).  Based on its plain and 
ordinary meaning, we find the term "developed" requires affirmative acts on the 
part of the owner to transfer the property from raw land to a more improved state.   
In light of these definitions, we look at the language contained within the 1981 
R&Cs. The 1981 R&Cs specifically state that the document may be amended only 
"by a vote of a majority of the then owners of the lots into which the property . . . 
shall have been developed . . . ."  In drafting the 1981 R&Cs, Lincoln specifically 
required the lot to be developed prior to possessing a right to change the 1981 
R&Cs. Appellants set forth no evidence—whether it be roads, sewer lines, water, 
or electricity—that they instituted any improvements on the Property in the thirty 
years of their ownership as contemplated by the 1981 R&Cs.  We recognize 
Appellants possessed an easement for sewer, drainage, and utilities over the 
Property, but an easement, in and of itself, is not tantamount to an improvement.  
Further, while Appellants claim the unrecorded plat dividing the Property into five 
smaller lots proves the lots were developed, we find this evidence is not conclusive 
on whether J.B. Stephens intended to develop and sell these five lots because the 
plat was never recorded. See Sleasman, 151 P.3d at 992-93 (finding "the most 
obvious example of 'development' is the platting process where building lots are 
made ready for sale or use for future improvement").  Moreover, Lincoln chose the 
past tense when it included the language "have been developed," as opposed to 
"may be developed" or "will be developed."  See generally Mathis v. Brown & 
Brown of S.C., Inc., 389 S.C. 299, 318, 698 S.E.2d 773, 783 (2010) (finding choice
of the past tense of the verbs "rendered" and "recompensed" in a statutory scheme 
as evidence the acts were to have occurred in the past as opposed to prospectively).  
We cannot imply language into the 1981 R&Cs that is not written, even if a 
different interpretation would be more favorable in the present day.  See S.C. Dep't 
of Natural Res. v. Town of McClellanville, 345 S.C. 617, 622, 550 S.E.2d 299, 302 
(2001) ("The court may not limit a restriction in a deed, nor, on the other hand, will 
a restriction be enlarged or extended by construction or implication beyond the 
clear meaning of its terms even to accomplish what it may be thought the parties 
would have desired had a situation which later developed been foreseen by them at 
the time when the restriction was written." (emphasis omitted)).  Even if 
Appellants took some prefatory steps to develop the Property into five lots, under 
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the plain meaning of the term, we find Appellants failed to develop the lots prior to
amending the 1981 R&Cs.  Thus, we affirm the circuit court's finding on this 
issue.7 
II. Reliance upon State and Local Law
Next, Appellants claim the circuit court and Respondents improperly cite to 
Section 30-5-240 of the South Carolina Code (2007) and a Greenville County 
ordinance for the proposition that a sale pursuant to an unrecorded plat is void or 
voidable. We address each argument in turn.     
Section 30-5-240 states,
When real property is subdivided for the purpose of sale 
and is sold or offered for sale according to a plat of a 
survey thereof, the person first offering such property for 
sale shall file a plat or blueprint of such survey in the 
office of the clerk of court of the county in which such 
real estate is situate[d]. In the event that the owner fails 
to comply with the above provision he shall become 
liable to the purchaser or to any subsequent grantee of the 
land, or of any portion thereof, in such sum as shall be 
found necessary to procure and record such plat. 
(emphasis added).   
The relevant portion of the Greenville County ordinance states,  
The owner . . . of any land . . . who transfers, sells, or 
agrees to sell such land by reference to, or exhibition of, 
or by other use of a plat or subdivision of such land 
before such plat has been approved by the Planning 
Commission and recorded in the office of the County 
Register of Deeds shall forfeit and pay a penalty of $100 
7 Because we find the language of the 1981 R&Cs regarding developed lots is 
unambiguous, we decline to consider extrinsic evidence submitted by Appellants in 
support of their argument that the lots were developed.  See McClellanville, 345 
S.C. at 623, 550 S.E.2d at 303 (holding that a court will not examine extrinsic 
evidence to interpret a contract absent an ambiguity). 
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for each lot so transferred, sold, or agreed or negotiated 
to be sold. 
Greenville County, S.C., Ordinance 3870, § 1.3 (Dec. 13, 2004).  Appellants 
submitted no proof that either Appellants or any predecessor in interest ever 
submitted a plat, received approval for a plat, or recorded a plat as contemplated 
and required by law.8 
We find the failure to fulfill the requirements enunciated in the foregoing state and 
local law are evidence that J.B. Stephens did not intend to subdivide the Property 
for development purposes when the plat was initially prepared.  Further, although 
Appellants' failure to abide by these rules of law would not necessarily invalidate a 
subsequent sale, we find it would be inequitable to permit Appellants to use an 
unrecorded plat as evidence that the lots were subdivided and intended for sale if 
the ordinance and statute require recordation as a prerequisite to sale.  See 
Buffington, 383 S.C. at 393, 680 S.E.2d at 291 ("[W]hile there is no formulaic 
balancing test, . . . this [c]ourt has consistently held that courts should consider 
equitable doctrines when determining whether to enforce a restrictive covenant and 
enjoin a landowner from using their land in a manner that violates the covenant.").  
Based on the foregoing, we find the circuit court did not err in relying upon section 
30-5-240 and a Greenville County ordinance as support for its conclusion that the 
Property was not developed into lots as contemplated by the 1981 R&Cs.    
III. Text of the 1981 R&Cs and the Drafter's Intent
Last, Appellants contend the circuit court failed to consider the text of the 1981 
R&Cs as well as the drafter's intentions when it concluded the Property was not 
developed into lots.  We disagree. 
Appellants first claim another provision within the 1981 R&Cs confirms that the 
lots in question were developed.  Appellants cite to a sentence within the 1981 
R&Cs that permits the restrictions to be enforced against "any property owner of 
8 Appellants cite to the Greenville County tax map sheet, which reflects the 
Property is demarcated into five smaller lots, as evidence that the plat was at some 
point submitted to the authorities.  However, the circuit court never noted this 
evidence in its order, and Appellants failed to submit further proof that the plat was 
submitted to the Greenville County Planning Commission for approval. 
42 

  
 
 
 
any lot into which the property described above shall subsequently be cut." 
(emphasis added).  Appellants essentially argue that a "lot" is merely property 
which has been "cut" from a larger parcel of land.  Assuming this to be true, this 
reference does not require us to find the Property was developed into five lots.  
This provision pertains to an owner's ability to enforce the restrictive covenants 
against any other owner who violates the 1981 R&Cs.  We find it reasonable to 
conclude that any owner could bring an action to enforce the 1981 R&Cs against 
any other owner, regardless of how many lots the owner in violation of the 1981 
R&Cs possesses. 
On the other hand, Lincoln specifically required the lots to be developed before an 
owner could vote to amend or modify the 1981 R&Cs.  Further, we note that in the 
amendment provision within the 1981 R&Cs, Lincoln chose to afford each 
homeowner within Watson's Orchard Subdivision a vote based on residency within 
the subdivision. However, for the owners in possession of property outside the 
subdivision, their voting rights were not based merely on owning a "lot," but on 
owning a "developed lot." We find it reasonable to conclude that homeowners 
within the subdivision and property owners who expended financial resources to 
develop their lots would be most affected by any changes to the 1981 R&Cs and, 
thus, would be afforded the greatest voting rights.
Next, Appellants claim the circuit court ignored the testimony of Patrick Grayson, 
the attorney who drafted the 1981 R&Cs, regarding the meaning of "developed 
lots." Because the language in the 1981 R&Cs was unambiguous, we find the 
circuit court did not need to consider extrinsic evidence—by way of testimony or 
otherwise—regarding the meaning of this term.  See McClellanville, 345 S.C. at 
623, 550 S.E.2d at 303 (holding that a court will not examine extrinsic evidence to 
interpret a contract absent an ambiguity).    
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the circuit court's decision is 
AFFIRMED. 
GEATHERS and McDONALD, JJ., concur. 
43 

